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# British Imperial Watchtower Men,\* the Boers and the Importation of Chinese Labor to South Africa, 1904-1910

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me

British Imperial Watchtower  
Men,\* the Boers and the  
Importation of Chinese  
Labor to South Africa, 1904-10

FOR: Rowe  
FROM: Nesbitt

NORTHWESTERN  
SPRING, 1975



\* "British Watchtower Men" refers to a May 18, 1903 address to the Johannesburg Municipal Congress by Lord Alfred Milner. Speaking to an Afrikaaner audience of the necessity for not handling the 'native' and Asiatic labor questions in a crude manner, Milner urged the deployment of a more sophisticated, "civilized", and "discriminating" strategy. Continuing that these (questions) were not merely local matters, he concluded, "now, I invite your consideration to some wider aspects of these questions to which I have referred. I am the man on the watchtower, and the man on the watchtower may see further than the men on the veldt, not in the least because he is a better man, but because of the mere accident of his topographical position."

(The Milner Papers, 1899-1905,  
Vol. II, Headlam, ed. 1933,  
p. 470.)



"To make present sacrifices for the sake of the future is an essentially human act: a constituent of the human condition. All stories from all times offer examples. And in this his story is as old as the first traveller's. To save money for the sake of one's family's future was a cornerstone of the original capitalist ethic, which prescribed it as the duty of self-help. There are thousands of 19th-century moral tales which illustrate the principle. To make an offering to the future, however, presupposes continuity: not necessarily of one's own individual interest (the offering may involve the sacrifice of one's own life), but of the values in which one believes. The sacrifice now is offered in the conviction that it will be recognizable and receivable in the future. The sacrifice, in fact, is to a tradition, whose continuity into the future seems assured. The content of the tradition changes: a religious belief in God's will, the hopes of a family fortune, the destiny of a nation, the necessity of revolution. Yet all are grounded in a sense of continuity, and all seek a confirmation in that... The migrant worker sacrifices the present for the future under circumstances which continually confound his sense of continuity. Scarcely anything he experiences or witnesses confirms the value of his sacrifice. Only when he returns to redeem his exchange-units of time will he gain acknowledgement for what he was forced to do. Meanwhile, he lives in a situation of almost total unacknowledgement.

He has at least the company and support of compatriots who are also migrants. They may live side by side, but they do not live in the same present -- they come closest together when they talk about the past. To keep faith with his decision, each has to picture his own individual future of acknowledgement to himself. And he has to do this countless times every day. Only from this picture can he receive confirmation. And to construct the picture he refers to the past. What is characteristic of the migrant worker is not that he sacrifices the present for the future, but that his condition is such that the value of his present sacrifice is denied. This is why his condition resembles imprisonment."

(Berger, Michael, "Migrations  
into Hell")



## INTRODUCTION

On June 18, 1904, after a thirty-seven day journey, the 2,800 ton Tweeddale docked at Durban, South Africa. After inspection by a medical team, the ship unloaded its 1,052 passengers. Three passengers had died en route and two had left the vessel before it had left port at Hong Kong.<sup>1</sup> The passengers were escorted by officials from the Foreign Labor Department and the Natal Police to a newly constructed wooden barracks called the Natal Depot. At the Depot each person was registered, fingerprinted, asked if he had received the advance entered against his name, and finally, if he was a willing immigrant. After an evening meal of rice, fish and vegetables, the 1,052 men were returned to the compound where they then awaited the morning and their departure for the 20-hour train ride to the Transvaal at Volksrust. June 20th, the train then delivered the 1,052 men to the New Comet mine where their contracts and medical certificates were registered and they were marched off to their rooms to start work as soon as possible.

Thus began a trickle of imported Chinese laborers to the South African mining industry which would swell in the years 1904-1910 to as high a number as 63,453 workers. But how and why was Chinese labor imported into South Africa? What was the experience of the Chinese who came? Why was the flow terminated? These and others are questions to which the following paper is addressed.



The 1904 "Chinese coolie"<sup>2</sup> experiment, conducted jointly by the British Colonial office and the Transvaal government, was a response to what was perceived and projected as an acute labor shortage by mining and financial interests in both Britain and South Africa. The causes of this labor shortage<sup>3</sup> were: the dislocation and interruption of production resultant from the Anglo-Boer War; the fact that Africans during the War had been able to get better paying military-related work and then didn't want to return to the mines; and finally, the work conditions in the mines themselves that made Africans seek other work. (It might be this last factor was particularly important in determining the attitudes of Africans at the time towards work in the gold mines and hence, in determining their tendency to avoid work in the mines.) The death rate in the mines for 1903 was seventy-one per thousand workers.<sup>4</sup> This fact, plus the harshness of the drop in wages for African workers,<sup>5</sup> was undoubtedly very much on the minds of all African workers at the time.

The acuteness of the labor shortage felt in the post-war years was expressed by the Chairman of the Witwatersrand Native Labor Association (W.N.L.A. or WENELA), Mr. F. Perry when in 1902 he spoke to the first annual meeting. After a long exposition of the problems faced by recruiters getting "boys" from regions like Bechuanaland, Central Africa and Portuguese Africa, he said:

At present the mines estimate their immediate requirements at 145,000. That may be said to be an outside figure, but you must remember that it does not allow for the opening up of new properties and deep levels. A great deal of work would be started in the course of the next year if labor were available which is not allowed for at all in that estimate of 145,000. When we get



a little further on and ask what will be wanted in two or three years' time, the figures go up to 200,000 and 300,000."6

This same problem -- the shortage of cheap, unorganized labor -- was similarly but perhaps, more directly addressed by Mr. Hennen Jennings, Chairman of the Engineers Committee of the Chamber of Mines, in January, 1903, in a report presented to Mr. Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies. He stated:

We are all in accord in our belief that the native of South Africa is an excellent and powerful muscular machine, and if he can be obtained in sufficient numbers and induced to remain on the mines for extended periods, we do not desire to look further afield; but the fact is we are alarmingly short of the complement required to run the existing mines, and it may be well to briefly state the reasons which appear to us to explain the present conditions of things. For expansive prosperity, whether from the aspect of the shareholders in the mines of the white employees thereof, we believe that an abundant supply of cheap labor drawn from the colored races is of supreme importance, and without this aid there do not appear to be any great potentialities for the shareholder, the white mine employee, or the country at large.7

But it was the W.N.L.A. Chairman, Mr. Perry, who most fully understood and articulated the problem of obtaining labor for the Transvaal in the post-war years. In the same 1902 address, continuing his presentation, Chairman Perry illustrated how neither increased taxation on South African natives nor "the re-introduction of slavery or even of systematic forced labor (except for public works)" would turn the 25,000 laborers "hitherto being obtained into 100,000; especially," he added, "not in a year or two years".8 Then after asking the critical question, namely, "How then are we to meet the increased demands of the Rand in the immediate future?"9 Perry went on to say that "after removing the extraneous



obstacles" -- e.g., Portuguese government reluctance to send as many laborers to the Rand as before, given their own increasing plantation production -- then, could the immediate problem of restoration to pre-war economic production rates, especially those on the Rand, be met.

He added, however,

"But if we so solve the first problem, and if we do obtain from the old sources the native labor required to work 6,000 stamps, the second problem remains, that is, to provide sufficiently soon a further great number of native laborers for new development. It is here that these new sources may help us... if insurmountable obstacles prevent us from recruiting, or if recruiting shows no sign of producing the numbers that will be needed, then again we shall be brought to a stop. The second problem will confront us as urgently as the first confronts us today. Now it is a question of obtaining 100,000 native laborers from the old sources. Then it will be a question of obtaining a second hundred thousand from the new. If it is plain that there is no prospect of doing that, you will have to choose between restricting the development of the mines and obtaining labor elsewhere.<sup>(10)</sup> (emphasis mine)

Thus was the die cast and the problem stated. In order to meet the structural demands of the pre-World War I South African economy for a larger labor supply, new recruitment methods had to be developed and new markets created."

As events have shown, the Chinese "coolie" experiment was not the first such plan to emanate from the British Colonial Office, nor would it be the last.

As early as 1876, Mr. J. X. Merriman, Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works in the Cape Colony, called for a survey to assess the available labor supply:



"In the Cape the Government is called on to 'survey mankind from China to Peru' in the hope of creating and maintaining a class of cheap laborers who will thankfully accept the position of helots and not be troubled with the inconvenient ambition of bettering their conditions."

(Quoted in Van der Horst, Sheila, Native Labor in South Africa, Cass, 1971, p.118)

In 1900 British colonial officials had planned to employ Arab and Chinese labor in the coal mines of Southern Rhodesia.<sup>12</sup>

On May 7, 1903, Governor Milner of the Transvaal Colony telegraphed Viceroy Curzon in India asking for 'at least' 10,000 Indians to work in the railways (later this was specifically changed to a request for mine workers) of Transvaal and the Urange River Colony. He added that they would be repatriated at the end of their engagement. Curzon's response was basically a negative one, raising the question of the treatment of Indians who had gone as indentured servants to Natal and Cape Colony. This was the beginning of a series of exchanges between Curzon, London and Lord Milner, culminating in Curzon's May 23, 1904 secret note, 'Indians in the Transvaal'. In this he argued:

"Our point of view does not appear to be understood by Lord Milner... the fact is that we are not in the least anxious for the Indian to go to the Transvaal at all. The relief given to our labor problems is infinitesimal... why should we throw away our solitary pawn\* (the demand for "coolie" labor)?... I hold most strongly to the opinion that the Government of India should decline to take action to permit (Indian recruitment for the Transvaal).<sup>13</sup>

\*It must be emphasized that Curzon's unwillingness to send Indian laborers to the Transvaal was not motivated by humanitarian concerns. Rather, the "solitary pawn" notion reveals his intention to use potential Indian labor as a wedge for maximizing his (Curzon's) own power within British Imperial administration circles. Much of the correspondence between Curzon and Milner indicates a strong competition between the two in terms of performing their jobs as overseas servants of the British Crown.



Thus it was that the Colonial office decided that the topic should be tabled indefinitely.

But in fact those searching for new sources for labor continued without pause. On May 12, 1903, Governor Milner sent the following telegram to Secretary of State Chamberlain:

No. 135. Transvaal Chamber of Mines anxious to send mission to West Africa viz hinterland of Lagos and Nigeria to ascertain whether suitable labor can be obtained for mines. In order not to lose time would you agree to mission of inquiry proceeding at once with the object (1) of obtaining information (2) if information favorable, of bringing back experimental batch of, say, 1,000 laborers in conditions to be determined by local authorities?"<sup>14</sup>

After consultations with his governor of Lagos, a month later Chamberlain cabled back that Nigeria was "hopelessly underpopulated owing to recent slavery", and that he regretted to say that there was no hope of getting labor from that quarter.<sup>15</sup> Finally it should be pointed out that unskilled white labor was experimented with -- if only briefly. During 1903, 900 English navvies were employed in Natal in railway construction. At about the sametime, a smaller group of Italians were used on the Cape Natal railroad. Both groups were terminated within seven months as too costly. A similar effort was made in the mining sector at the Village Main Reef mine where unskilled whites were hired to work along with natives. The whites were paid the astonishing rate of 10 s. a day plus food and lodging, yet never remained in the job for more than a month at a time. During the month of September 1903 alone the Village Main Reef mine lost over £3,000 per 100 king stamps. The experiment in white unskilled labor was rapidly abandoned. But the larger question of white labor on the gold mines is more complex.



And though it cannot be fully explored in this paper, let us examine several critical aspects.

First, as the accompanying graphs amply demonstrate (See appendices D & E), while the total number of persons employed rises dramatically after 1902 the proportion of white employees remains stable from the end of the Boer War to World War I - roughly a ratio of 1 white to every 8 non-whites.

Secondly, whites, other than mine owners - involved in the mining industry were basically employed in skilled worker categories. White mine workers in South Africa were a classic "labor aristocracy" concerned with maintaining an elite status through the mechanism of white skin privilege. Long before the Chinese experiment, whites in the mining industry had split into two categories: 1) capitalist owners and managers and 2) wage earning workers, with the latter group - subjectively - denying the historic class relationship between itself and African workers. And, objectively, being severed from the development of any solidarity tendencies by facts like white mine worker salaries increasing 40% by 1919 while the real value of African wages decreased during the same period. Thus, does the working white labor force present a fairly consistent image of a dominant (white) group and at the same time a subordinate (working) class. There are of course fluctuations, e.g., a brief period in which white women are employed in order to defeat colored clerks, who, as an organized body, were demanding higher wages. And Frederick Johnstone has recently written an unpublished paper, "Class Conflict of Color Bars in the South African Gold Mining Industry, 1910-26", which speaks to other aspects of this question. But let us move on to consider more basic questions about gold.<sup>16</sup>



What was there about the production of gold, what was its economic potential that so much experimentation in the procuring of a large pool of cheap labor would be conducted? A central consideration is understanding the role of gold in the nineteenth century world economy (and that of today). For gold and the labor to extract it from the rich reefs of South Africa was, as the February 10, 1903 Times of London indicates:

...a matter of enormous importance, not merely to the Transvaal and to those interested in the mines but to the whole of South Africa. Five-sixths of the exports from South Africa consisted of minerals, and it followed that the more minerals South Africa could export the more goods she could afford to import and the more business, by the exchange of products, would be done -- with advantage to the whole of South Africa and to manufacturers and traders in England, the rest of the Empire and the whole world.<sup>17</sup>

It is important to note in this respect the relationship drawn in contemporary accounts between the South African gold fields and London.

For as E. J. Hobsbawm has noted (as have many others), "London...was the real economic hub of the world, the pound sterling its foundation between 1870 and 1913."<sup>18</sup>

And behind the pound sterling? The final standard of value during the period of 1814-1914 for all monetary transactions, local or international, no matter how complex, was gold.

Gold was (and maybe still is) "the eternal treasure".<sup>19</sup> In the nineteenth century, and early twentieth, "official mints coined all gold brought to them free of charge; all paper currency was convertible into gold at face-value,"<sup>20</sup> and the full freedom to import and export gold was an essential part of the system, providing equilibrium between countries..."<sup>21</sup>

The centrality of gold, historically and presently, to capitalism<sup>22</sup> cannot be minimized. True, its value fluctuates, and owing to different



economic crises complex steps have been taken to move away from gold. But the flittering yellow dust, the lustrous, chemically stable, metallic element remains an oldtime religion and Karl Marx wrote in Kapital in 1864:

Capitalist production forever strives to overcome this metallic barrier, the material and fantastic barrier of wealth and its movements, in proportion as the credit system develops, but forever breaks its head on this same barrier.<sup>23</sup>

The most significant economic dimension of South African gold production, though, is the fact that consistently it has been a leading, if not the key, producer of gold for the world. In 1899 the Rand produced 27.6 percent of the world's total output, and in 1903 because of the interruption of the Anglo-Boer-War, South African output plunged to 18.8 percent. But in the following years the rate increased steadily as the following table shows:

<u>OUTPUT OF GOLD AS PERCENTAGE OF WORLD TOTAL</u> <sup>24</sup>								
S.Africa	<u>1904</u>	<u>1905</u>	<u>1906</u>	<u>1907</u>	<u>1908</u>	<u>1909</u>	<u>1910</u>	<u>1974</u>
	22.5	26.7	29.8	32.3	32.9	32.2	34.2	66.6

In order to understand the 1904-1910 Chinese "coolie" experiment in the Rand gold industry some elaboration about the nature of the gold mining process itself is helpful.<sup>25</sup> Today, ore-bearing gold is dug from the depths of the earth at depths between 5,000 to 12,000 feet. Before 1910 most mines were about 3,000 feet below the surface with a few as much as 4,000 feet deep.

As South African gold is a low-yield grade, approximately 2½ tons of



rock must be processed in order to produce one ounce of gold. The process of mining involves passing up and down daily at various shifts a virtual army of underground workers; it involves the vital activity of draining the huge holes created of water and supplying them with air; it involves supplying workers with the necessary tools, explosives stores and materials and it involves feeding and sheltering (at some level) the workers employed. As one of the Anglo American Corporation engineers recently wrote:

The way gold occurs in the Witwatersrand geological system -- at considerable depth (in fact the deepest gold mines in the world are here), in narrow reefs and in rock which is almost steel-hard -- calls for the use of large numbers of manual workers. Although the gold mines continue to devote a great deal of time and money to the development of a mechanical mining machine, they have not yet succeeded in perfecting one, and the actual operation of mining gold ore remains highly labor-intensive.<sup>26</sup> (emphasis mine)

It was the early realization by Lord Milner and others that: a) South Africa had enormous stores of untapped gold; b) that that resource had to be and could be exploited rapidly and unmercifully; and c) that it would take an enormous amount of labor to perform this task, which led to the adoption of the plan to bring in an extra source of labor which ended up in being Chinese labor. In a March 1904 letter Milner expressed this view as follows:

It matters enormously at what pace we get it (the gold) out... under the actual circumstances we cannot get it out too fast, because in any case the supply will last for many years, and that being so, the faster we get it the greater is the overspill, if I may use that word, over what is in any case necessary to remunerate the capital invested, and it is that over-spill which benefits the local community and fills the coffers of the State and can be used for the general advantage of the country.<sup>27</sup>

One must also recall that we are talking in the context of the recently concluded Anglo-Boer War; for the "hidden agenda" which Milner had in mind



was that ultimately the "over-spill" would go not so much to the local (Boer) community as to the British settlers and the British empire. In a telegram to Mr. Chamberlain he urged:

Our aim should be to get on as fast as possible with all recuperative work. This will both keep up the prestige of the government, and help to keep in this country the thousands of splendid and willing British settlers who are anxious to find employment here. Despite the present gush, a British population is our only ultimate safeguard, and just now we have our pick of the Empire for almost every industry as well as for the land. The great thing is to restart the machine...<sup>28</sup>

And so it was that the machine was cranked back up. At a March 1903 conference at Bloemfontein, South Africa, convened to discuss customs and railway matters and attended by representatives of all the South African Colonies, a resolution was introduced, and unanimously passed, that:

The permanent settlement in South Africa of Asiatic races would be injurious and should not be permitted; but that, if industrial development positively requires it, the introduction of unskilled laborers under a system of Government control only, by which provision is made for indenture and repatriation at the termination thereof, should be permissible.<sup>29</sup>

But even while the Bloemfontein Conference was in session, Milner and the heads of the mining industry had instructed Mr. Ross Skinner, then-Commissioner for the Chamber of Mines in California,<sup>30</sup> British Columbia, the Federated Malay States and China to do the groundwork necessary to implement a plan for the importation of Chinese indentured labor. His report on the resources available for the recruitment of labor in China was presented to the Milner-led Transvaal administration in late October 1903. On December 28th, with the full support of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines and Mr. Milner, Sir George Farrar introduced into the Transvaal Legislative Council a draft ordinance for the importation of alien indentured labor. At about the same time, the same text was cabled to Mr. Lyttelton of the Foreign Office.<sup>31</sup>



One interesting aspect of the 1903 Ordinance which bears immediate underscoring is that it was conceived in so broad a fashion as to permit future labor needs to be met from other than the region of China. In the Ordinance, labor is defined as:

a male person belonging to a non-European race other than one of the races indigenuous to Africa South of 12 degrees North of the Equator introduced into this Colony under contract of service; 'unskilled labor' means such labor as is usually performed in this Colony by persons belonging to the aboriginal races or tribes of Africa South of the Equator.<sup>32</sup>

The main provisions of the Labor Importation Ordinance are:

- that no person or organization may import labor under the Act without license
- that indentured labor imported under the Act can only do unskilled labor<sup>33</sup> and only in the Witwatersrand District
- no contract be for longer than three years
- that no laborer under the Act be allowed to remain as a permanent inhabitant, or be employed in any other capacity than that of unskilled mine labor, not be permitted to own or lease property, or take out trade licenses or licenses for private mining
- that all laborers carry a prescribed identification passport and cannot leave the premises of accommodation for longer than 48 hours
- that all importers of labor should keep an open register of all laborers entering, all deaths, transfers, desertions, unlawful absences or offences committed by laborers
- that on the termination of contract either by time, illness, unsuitability, refractory conduct, the laborer be repatriated with the least possible delay
- that every laborer shall have provided for him six days work per week at the rate of one (1) shilling per diem
- that in order to be paid every laborer must bore a 36 inch hole or perform enough other activities so as to do a "fair day's work"
- that any laborer desiring to terminate his contract may at any time do so, on producing the sum necessary to cover his importation and repatriation expenses.<sup>34</sup>

(Later, a series of agreements between mine managers and the Foreign Labor Department added such regulations as: managers being able to stipulate the amount of work required from each worker each shift with the manager acting as judge as to whether or not the amount required had been done. Failure to get the required work done constituted breach of contract -



an offense punishable by imprisonment.)

Finally, with the effectualization of the 1903 Ordinance, the Foreign Labor Department was created (May 19, 1904). Based in Johannesburg, with offices and staff at Durban and the Chinese Treaty Ports, consisting of a superintendent, secretary, Chief Inspector and Travelling Inspector, Inspectors, Clerks, and Chinese Orderly Clerks for each of the various mining regions, the stated purpose of the Foreign Labor Department was to create and implement the elaborate arrangements necessary for getting Chinese labor working in the Rand gold fields,

without injury to the social structure of the community  
to its commercial interests, or to the alien laborers  
themselves.<sup>35</sup>

In actuality, the Foreign Labor Department represented a clear instance of the State intervening to perform a task that private capital in South Africa could not have managed, given the low level of development of its resources at that stage. Within the Foreign Labor Department was gathered all the police and military arms of the State, inspectors were military men with experience in China, the system of identification of the "coolies" introduced by one E. Henry (ex-Chief Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police Force and ex-advisor to the British military forces occupying Johannesburg during 1900) had grown out of police work in India and England and was an advance upon any other known methods (no Polaroid ID II cameras then), namely, the fingerprint system. Also involved in the initiation of the importation activity was the question of the Transvaal being able to meet its wartime debt of £30,000,000. Many in the Imperial Government felt that helping the Transvaal get its labor was the only way to see that in turn Her Majesty's Government got its money. Whether one points to the Emigration Convention of 1904, signed by Britain and China, which legitimized the



importation agreement between the Transvaal and China, or whether one looks at the lengths to which the Foreign Office went to administer the importation of the indentured Chinese, the 1904-10 Chinese "coolie" experiment is part of continual pattern of the process of capitalist development in South Africa being made possible by State intervention. Or as Martin Legassick recently put it:

South African capitalism, ... is characterized by extreme extra-economic coercion of the majority of the labor force... appropriation takes place by means of the economic wage relationship ... as Marx argued in Capital on the length of the working day, the state under capitalism reflects the balance of power in the class struggle between capital and labor, and therefore can extend or inhibit the power of capital to appropriate surplus.<sup>36</sup>

In June 1904, before the passing of the first Reading of the Labor Importation Ordinance and also before the publication of the Convention between the Government of the British Empire and the Chinese Imperial Authority, the Labor Importation Agency, Ltd., was organized by the Johannesburg chapter of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines. The Chairman of the Board of the new agency was none other than Mr. Joseph Perry who also was Board Chairman for the W.N.L.A. and before that had been Imperial Secretary to the High Commissioner for South Africa, Lord Milner. (Additionally, Perry like all the members of the Transvaal Leg Co, had been appointed to that august body by Lord Milner). This particular combination of personnel and Lord Milner's haste to "get on with it" explains how, after a thirty-seven day voyage from Hong Kong, the SS Tweeddale docked in Durban with its cargo by the 18th of June. This early June docking and the presence of some 47,217 "coolies" on the Rand with another 2,000 intransit by the end of 1905 indicate the extent to which the actual process of importation was underway well before a South African Colony legislative decision to import labor had been made. This sequence of events make far less accurate any



historical narratives<sup>37</sup> emphasizing the so-called "great controversy" raging between Boer yeomanry and British Colonialists concerning the proposed importation of "Asiatic Labor". The reconstruction of events clearly indicates that the Colonial Office and the mining magnets and made their decisions long before, and that it would be imposed upon the conquered Boers -- like it or not. The legislative process had only the trappings of authorization.

The workers who came were initially from Southern China (Kwang Fung Province) as there was know to be a large surplus population in that region. But after a severe outbreak of beri-beri in 1904 (which killed 137 and resulted in 537 being repatriated as incapacitated) and some delicate diplomatic balancing to keep Southern Chinese reserved as a surplus labor force for British Malaysia, the Transvaal Labor Importation Agency recruited largely Northern Chinese. This was, in fact, a break for the recruiters, as the Russo-Japanese War had closed the border with Manchuria which normally received thousands of Northern Chinese migrant workers.<sup>38</sup>

The stage of development in China itself - China in the early 1900's being mostly rural agriculture, with some small handicraft industry and an even smaller number of industries - made China a rich source of cheap labor for other regions with the industrial structure needing the labor. Even as late as 1910, there were "as far as is known, only 4,500 miles of railway, 26 cotton mills, and 31 modern flour mills, in the whole country."<sup>38A</sup>

The Chinese were recruited in China by means of the local press printing the text of the Contract of Service. British recruiters, assisted by Chinese helpers, licensed by the Transvaal Emigration Act, and representing specific companies, would then process potential laborers at the



various depots in China. After signing the contract each man would receive a medical examination and an advance sum which was to be left with his family. Once having signed the Contract, he could no longer leave the Depot. Signed-up, he was photographed and given a metal badge with his shipping number on it. Arrangements could be made at that time to have all or part of his salary periodically telegraphed back to his village via the depot in China. (Ultimately, this plan was abandoned as wages often did not go beyond the clerks and intermediaries, Chinese and British, back in the Depots).

The Chinese laborers worked six days per week and were given Christmas, Good Friday and six different Chinese holidays "off" per year. Most (40%) underground workers were employed in hand drilling. Others shovelled up rock broken by blasting which in turn had to be hauled to the surface. The other major type of underground work was "tramping", i.e., the hand pushing of trucks of broken rock along the stopes (horizontal tunnels) of the mine to a point in the shaft where it could be hauled to the surface. At no point in the underground work was the temperature less than 90 degrees F. with a 90% humidity rate. Most worked in at least knee depth water at all times while underground. There was very little pump equipment used to remove the water. And the men often waited several hours in wet clothing while the skips were being used to transport rock to the surface.\* Even today, according to the January, 1974 National Geographic, mine recruits are taken through harsh, daily four-hour exercises racing up and down steps in a heated room at double speed in order "to build up the tolerance for the heat and humidity of the depths."

\* See Appendix B, for pneumonia death rate.



Also, as the mine shafts were sunk more deeply, because of the mineral veins hitting water tables, the amount of water, like the temperature in the mine increased proportionately.<sup>39</sup> Finally, it must be remembered that the mine owners' concern at that time was only profit maximization through intensive labor methods. Investment into capitalization and labor-saving machinery would be a post WWII development. (Indeed, it is something that only now are the Rand mineowners seriously embarking upon).

Life on the compounds for the Chinese workers was a harsh entrapment. They were paid one (1) shilling per 10-hour shift. Though legally permitted to bring their wives, only four Chinese women ever appeared. The Transvaal Encyclopedia of Mining (Op. Cit.) reports that little of the money earned ever reached China. Rather, it was spent locally either through lavish purchasing ("the Chinese not really being thrifty after all") or excessive gambling -- the "latter vice being deeply rooted in the Chinese national character". (p. 540)

The compounds at Durban, were laid out in a square with kitchen and bath facilities inside. There were approximately 15 roomettes on each side of the square, each measuring 38' x 16' and "capable of accommodating 24 to 40 men."<sup>40</sup> Each roomette was fitted with 40 concrete bunks. The bunks averaged 61 cm. wide and 2.1 meters long. The bunk served both as the sleeping area and as the storage area for each worker. The average vertical height of each hut depended upon whether it had single-tiered, double-tiered or occasionally triple-tiered bunks but in no instance was it more than 14 feet. (It must be pointed out however, that this was permitted to be reduced to 12 feet when in 1904 a commission was appointed to "inquire into the amount of air space required per head in colored compounds" and discovered that the "coolies" needed only 200 cubic feet of air space and not 250".<sup>41</sup> The facilities provided at each mine varied



much more, were less immediately under public scrutiny, and constituted even more harsh housing accommodations than those at the compounds.

Food was prepared by a special staff of Chinese "coolie-cooks". And food and kitchen facilities were periodically inspected. Early, it was discovered that Northern Chinese could not "consume anything approaching the 2½ lbs of rice per diem"<sup>42</sup> which has been scheduled for them. Thus, the following daily menu intended for "the inferior class of people" -- the Southerners, was adopted for all:

1½ lbs. of rice  
½ lb. of vegetables  
½ lb. of dried or fresh fish or meat  
½ oz. of tea  
½ oz. of nut oil  
salt<sup>43</sup>

"Hot tea was always available and the quality of the food supplied and the cooking arrangements were excellent."<sup>44</sup> The average cost of feeding a "coolie" was only 11 shillings per month. And though during that first year 469 Chinese died,<sup>45</sup> and 1,167 were repatriated to China owing to physical infirmity or disease, Lord Selborne wrote:

"It cannot be too widely understood that the normal condition of affairs on a mine where Chinese are employed is that of tranquility."<sup>46</sup>

Finally, and only if the tranquility was disturbed:

In the compounds order is maintained by a compound manager and a staff of Chinese police (selected from among the coolies at the depots in China prior to embarkation and after arrival at Durban). Many of these policemen have served in the Chinese army, or under British administrations elsewhere".<sup>47</sup>

Generally, the conditions of work and living speak of a quality of life that is best captured in the selection from "migrations to hell" which opened this paper.



The daily routine was dull and monotonous. A working day was ten hours long at the end of which the worker only faced the activity of sleep or sitting around awaiting the next shift. The mining companies provided no recreational facilities.

Finally, the traditional method for institutionally confined men to release some frustrations and anxieties - women - was not allowed to the Chinese "coolies" until late in the period. It was 1908, when Voortrekker wives' fear of wandering "coolie" deserters had peaked, that the Chinese were permitted to go to African brothels - even as far away as Johannesburg.\* And the 49 suicides which occurred in the mining barracks between July 1905 and June 1906,<sup>48</sup> the incidence of homosexuality alluded to in the historical documentation,<sup>49</sup> both these phenomena and others, like the excessive gambling, speak to the heightened sense of alienation and misery felt by the Chinese workers at that time. But is is South African economist, Francis Wilson, describing the mines of a more recent period who best expresses the sense of what work was like in the mines. He writes:

"To get some idea of the working conditions with which those actually mining the gold have to cope, it is perhaps easiest to start thinking of a road laborer digging up a pavement with a jack hammer drill. Now imagine him doing that work thousands of feet underground, in intense heat, where he cannot even begin to stand upright, and where the drill is not going with the aid of gravity into the ground beneath, but where it has to be held horizontal and driven into the wall in front. Add to this picture the noise of the road drill magnified several times by the confined space; dust...which invades the lungs and the possibility that the roof of the mine may suddenly cave in under the pressure, or that the spark from the drill or a careless cigarette might ignite a pocket of methane gas, and one has some idea of the work of a 'machine boy'."

(Wilson, Labor in the South African Gold Mines, 1911-1969, Cambridge Press, 1972, p.20)

\* Much too little is known about the crucial question, <sup>of</sup> ~~the~~, the relationship of women to the mining process, their employment in and around the compound. In other situations, copper mining, in the southwest of the United States, Phelps-Dodge to be specific, mine management has transported in women for the workers' amusement - part of keeping a contented work force. What has been the pattern



in South Africa? One can only speculate.

With the departure of the Tweeddale in May 1904, a process was set in motion, one that has often accompanied periods of rapid capital accumulation and economic growth with attendant dislocation in the traditional patterns of social relations.<sup>50</sup> It was a process which was, as Mr. James Jamieson, Superintendent of the Foreign Labor Department, 1904-06, commented:

...a subject of comment amongst the resident officers conversant with the Chinese in their own country that after a few months on the Rand the "coolies" became 'de-Chinese-ed'... a sudden uprooting of ancient landmarks defining the path of duty, a relaxation of time-honored canons of behavior, the withdrawal of the collective moral atmospheric pressure brought to bear on the individual from birth by the family, village and community at large, and if after a short sojourn here the "coolie" finds that he can afford to disregard with impunity prescriptions hitherto considered sacred, it is not surprising that he should develop a tendency towards degeneration.<sup>51</sup>

But it was much more than "a tendency towards degeneration" that marked the response of the 50,000 imported Chinese workers to the conditions they encountered in South Africa. In the year June 1905 to July 1906, 47,600 Chinese were employed.<sup>52</sup> In that same period, thirteen thousand, five hundred and thirty-two were convicted of criminal offenses ranging from petty thievery to assault and murder.<sup>53</sup> In that same period, 8,009 desertions were cited.<sup>54</sup>

No doubt assisting the rise in the desertion rate (and bespeaking the desperation people felt) was the appearance within the first year of copies of a map drawn with Chinese characters which were circulating surreptitiously throughout many compounds. The map supposedly showed the route for the mine workers to return to China by walking over land.\*

A final indication of the "coolies" response to what they encountered was that during the first year of the experiment the Transvaal Attorney General reported 21,205 cases of unlawful absence.<sup>55</sup> (i.e. being away from the mining premises more than 48 hours).

\* See 1906 Report on Control of Chinese Indentured Laborers.

One early work on this question I'd like to examine is: Winter, James, "Organic Inhumanity." South African Notes on Ukulabala or Women Slavery in Natal, Contederation and Annexation and the Diamond and Gold Fields. about women slaves for sale under government sanction. 66pp. pub 1877.



It all amounted to the Chinese workers on the Rand in 1904-06 rebelling against their conditions. The South Africans at the time attributed some of the crimes to the slovenly, low-life character of the type of Chinese being imported. The desertion rate was attributed to the presence of many gamblers and the fact that those gambling, often losing, had to flee for their lives in order to avoid paying the debt incurred and "to save face". The 1906 Special Committee on Control of Chinese Indentured Laborers concluded that "the causes of the trouble did not arise from the greater restriction put upon the liberty of the laborers, but were to be attributed rather to the class of men brought to this country."<sup>56</sup>

Within two months after their June, 1904 arrival, the resistance activities of the "coolie" laborers began. As of July 1905, 620 Chinese were dead because of "crime-related activities". There is a regular pattern of theft, anti-property rioting (i.e., window-breaking, destroying living quarters, etc.), and breaking and entering -- damage to property that is a standard expression of class rebellion. A mere glance at some of the entries from the List of Riots and Disturbances Amongst Chinese Laborers which Necessitated the Calling in of Police Assistance<sup>57</sup> during the period June 22nd 1904 to July 30, 1905, indicates the fundamental economic and political roots to the grievances the Chinese were feeling:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Mine</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
3	North Randfontein	29/08/04	Slight misunderstanding about the deductions made from "ccolies" pay
20	French Rand	09/04/05	Due to a white miner (since dismissed) kicking over a "boolie's" food pan

(See Appendix I for full list)



The pattern of white miners roughly handling the "coolies" led to such serious retaliation on the part of the Chinese that white miners openly expressed "fears of attacks upon them whilst working underground".<sup>58</sup> That the atmosphere was clearly present for such antagonism is evidenced by such white attitudes as that in the following comment from Superintendent Evans of the Foreign Labor Department (to which Department, incidentally, the Chinese were expected to turn for the dispensation of justice):

Non-acquaintance with each other's language naturally renders communication difficult, and with such men, a blow or the application of a heavy boot, one naturally thought to be the most efficient means of conveying to a "coolie" an idea of what his white boss wants...<sup>59</sup>

Between mid-1904 and 1906, the tension continued to build. The "coolies" continued to be imported. By May 1906 Martini-Henry rifles from the Colonial Office were being distributed to farmers neighboring mines upon request.<sup>60</sup> The May 2nd 1906 Report of the Special Committee for Control recommended a cordon sanitaire comprising: wire fences be instituted around the premises of all mines; that roll call be made compulsory and conducted every morning, that European control on the mines be strengthened generally as a check on the Chinese mine police and interpreters, and

"that until such time as proper measures have been established for the control of laborers on the mine...men recruited locally from the farming population, with Zulus or other natives to assist, be enlisted in the force for the purpose of carrying out these cordon duties."<sup>61</sup>

As special police posts were being constructed around the mines having Chinese laborers, General Botha cabled directly to Her Majesty's Government that as a result of "crimes and outrages by Chinese "coolies", farms were daily being deserted, colored servants trekking away and a most lamentable state of unrest - such as not known within the memory of man - had settled in over the whole country".<sup>62</sup>



In the meanwhile in Britain, the issue of the importation of Chinese "slaves" had helped bring about the downfall of a Conservative Party government and the December, 1905 empowerment of a Liberal Party cabinet headed by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman.

Reminiscent of the nineteenth-century public debates in Britain over abolishing slavery, protagonists and antagonists were steadily being created as to the Transvaal's imparting "the Asiatics". Reports coming back of the Chinese being wantonly flogged under the condoning eye of Lord Milner<sup>63</sup> and newspaper commentaries, especially the coverage of the Manchester Guardian fed the Liberty Party platform that the "Transvaal "coolie" experiment" had to be ended. Tales of Chinese deserters seizing towns and raping Boer women - most of them "red herrings"<sup>64</sup> - fed Conservative Party positions that the experiment could continue but more police control of the "coolies" and a more decisive support of the Transvaal government was necessary. The sheaves of cables between Lyttleton (then Secretary of State for the Colonies) and Milner, and the volumes of Parliamentary Debate provide some indication of the magnitude of the Chinese labor question as a campaign issue.

Especially the question of a pending independent legislative for the Transvaal was pivotal in determining the Chinese labor experiment's future. For Lord Campbell, once he became Prime Minister feared, above all, a sensational exposé of the conditions of the Chinese workers that would in turn retard his planning for the Transvaal to itself assume more of the burden of government.

(A full investigation of conditions was carried out by barrister John Bucknell, legal advisor to the Crown Colony, in the summer of 1906 but its full content were never made part of either the Public Records or the Parliamentary Papers).

Within the half year from May 1906 until December, the debate about the Chinese Labor Experiment was decided.<sup>65</sup> And on the public debate level



it seemed as if the forces against the Chinese labor experiment had won a decisive victory.

By the Letters Patent of the Transvaal Constitution (December 6, 1906) it was determined that the "Labor Importation Ordinance, 1904" and all ordinances, rules, regulations and activities related to them would be repealed "and cease to have effect within the Colony", all this to be accomplished by December 7, 1907. In the end it was only by Act 19 of 1907, the Indentured Labor Laws Temporary Continuance Act, passed by the Transvaal legislature on August 2nd which permitted those Chinese then present on the Rand to finish out their contracts and prevented the "coolie labor experiment" from ending with the same flurry and rapidity with which it had begun.

In fact, however, it was a combination of two key factors which terminated the "coolie" experiment. First, its purpose had been served. The mines were back at full operation and were drawing once again African labor, especially labor from Mozambique. (Recruitment was going more smoothly in Mozambique, also because a jurisdictional dispute between the neophyte company, the Transvaal Mining Labor Company and WENELA had been resolved. The latter had obtained a complete monopoly.) In this respect, the crisis "had been weathered and the coolie experiment had performed admirably as the necessary Rostowian "take-off stage".

Secondly, the atmosphere of fear built up in the Transvaal by 1906-07 was real and substantive. The often-hysterical requests by neighboring Voortrekker farmers to get the Chinese out could not be ignored by the Transvaal mineowners or the British colonial government. For it was a fear hewn not simply by the fact of Chinese workers deserting and roaming the countryside but also by the 1906-08 Bambatha rebellion in Natal, the 1906



Demoraland uprising and the 1908 Herero Revolt in Southwest Africa, 1906-10, the Macua Makonde resistances in Mozambique, the 1905-07 Maji-Maji uprising in Tanzania, and the 1906-07 Watchtower Movement in Nyasaland.

### Historical Significance of the "Coolie" Experiment

I have described in this paper the importation of indentured Chinese men to the Transvaal gold mines during the period 1904-1910. This effort to garner labor was in the first instance a response to a shortage of unskilled African labor, not a dirth of labor but an insufficient number to keep costs low and profits high. There were other alternatives available. Higher wages might have been offered to the "native" workers. That this route was not taken speaks to the roots of the historical determined white skin privilege<sup>66</sup> cornerstone of the South African society. So, too, could the mine employers have sought to increase the supply of African labor available by offering improved conditions.<sup>67</sup> But this option was not taken up either.

The 1904-10 Chinese labor importation experiment had another basic function to perform. And that was to so stimulate the economy (i.e., boost gold production) as to retain the white skilled artisan population. Especially was Lord Milner concerned from the beginning with the retention of the British population. In a 1904 letter to Bishop Hamilton Baynes, responding to the Bishop's concern about the Chinese Question he wrote:

"true, mining is not a healthy trade...but the Chinese will be well cared for. They can earn here in a few years as much as they could at home in a lifetime, and will return to their own country with what to them appears a competency and even wealth. And this country absolutely requires some extraneous help to get along. Without it there will be a white exodus, and that of course, means a British exodus... To say that Chinese labor is a substitution for white labor is quite simply



a lie. But it (the lie) has taken in thousands of people. The exact opposite is the truth. Without a substratum of colored labor, white labor cannot exist here, and when the very rich mines are worked out, the country will return to its primitive barrenness - and to the Boer..."<sup>68</sup>

The successfulness of this dimension of the Chinese labor experiment is attested to in the fact that in 1904, 13,027 whites were employed on the mines and by 1910 there were 23,651.<sup>69</sup> In the same period the European population of the Transvaal is increased by 12,285 people, the majority of whom are women, to a total of nearly 425,000.

It was the securing of an additional source of cheap labor - China - that made it possible to offer the white workers steadily increasing wages throughout the 1904-10 period. And also to establish the practice of a two-tiered wage structure - an additional incentive for the white settler to remain in South Africa.

The 1904-10 Chinese Labor Experiment was the model for the crystallization of the African migratory labor system as it is practiced yet today.

Following in its wake would come the 1913 Natives Land Act (now called the Bantu Land Act No. 27 of 1913) which, in alienating the African people from their land, depriving them of the means of existence would force them into seeking work in the mining, agricultural and later manufacturing sector as an unorganized, landless proletariat. The "coolie" labor experiment was a lesson plan for the bosses of the mining industry in the systematic control of cheap labor. The creation of a Finger Impression Record Department in 1906 "established for all natives in labor districts and in the immediate neighborhood of those districts" was a direct derivative of the Chinese experience.<sup>70</sup> So, too, were measures like the amended Master and Servant Laws and the Native Labor Regulation Act of 1911 which codified the closed compound idea and made breach of



contract a criminal offense.

As well, the importation of Chinese labor systematized the conventional division between skilled and unskilled labor. (SEE APPENDIX H). Deeply threatened by the prospect of Chinese laborers coming who might compete for their jobs, it was the white mine workers who pressed for the identification of skilled jobs as available only to white workers.\* Indeed, it was white worker agitation that made it necessary for Milner in February 1903, to hurriedly amend the Labor Importation Ordinance prior to its acceptance by the Colonial Office. And it was this very 1903 categorizing of labor which was part of the foundation stone for the job reservation system practiced in South Africa today. And finally resulted in a customary pattern turning into a legal job color bar, namely the 1911 Regulations of the Mines and Works Act (later incorporated into the 1926 Mines and Works Amendment Act).

#### A FINAL NOTE -

The Republic of South Africa faces today an acute labor shortage in the gold mines.<sup>71</sup> The Rand gold mines are operating at 72 percent of their capacity. And in some mines the labor force has been reduced by over 50 percent. Mozambique and Malawi have usually provided the bulk of the manpower. Malawi, since the April 1974 crash of the WENELA transport plane (which killed 77 Malawian workers) has refused to send any more miners to South Africa - at least via the WENELA recruitment route. The Chamber of Mines and South African government are also greatly worried about the possible withdrawal of 100,000 plus Mozambiquian mine workers once the Frelimo-led government of that country attains independence on June 25th this year. If Frelimo and the incoming Mozambiquian government decide<sup>72</sup> to halt the nearly 100 year old flow of the Mozambiquian peasantry to the gold mines it would further aggravate the situation.

\*This initiative was part of a gradual destruction of the white South African worker's consciousness of himself as an exploited class, hence the destruction of any chance for solidarity struggles with his African co-worker. This one must add, however, is not an irreversible historical process.



The major reason for the labor shortage in South Africa's gold<sup>73</sup> mines, however, is not Frelimo's defeat of Portuguese colonialism. Rather, it is the continuum of labor uprisings<sup>74</sup> that have been going on for the last two years in the mines. In that period, as evidenced by at least 80 persons killed and well over 100,000<sup>75</sup> involved in strikes, riots, work stoppages, and walk-outs, it is unmistakably the case, as the Financial Times (London) recently wrote, that:

"What used to be a stable labor situation has been transformed into an inflammable one with violence likely to break out anywhere and, unlike lightning, perfectly capable of striking more than once in the same place."<sup>76</sup>

In a manner which reminds one of their "kith and kin" of the early twentieth century, the white "labor aristocracy" of South African mining has further deepened the present crisis by threatening to strike if any concessions are made permitting blacks to do mine work previously limited to whites. At the same time loosening up the job reservation policy and hiking up African wages are the only way the mining firms (and other industrial concerns, too) are going to be able to attract African labor. Especially as now they are more and more forced to search their own South African lands for labor no longer available from places like ex-Portuguese Africa.

The situation then has become one which is necessitating a somewhat novel approach. And some of the parameters of that approach can already be identified. First, South Africa is turning to Rhodesia. For the first time South Africa is turning to her white-ruled neighbor to the north to draw labor from there. And ultimately as many as 50,000 black Rhodesians (Zimbabweans) may migrate southwards to the Transvaal mines. (Needless to say, the turn to a new source of labor is a pattern which by now is familiar to the reader). There is an added twist, however, and that is a very upgraded pay scale (up to five times as much as is available for Zimbabwean miners in their own country). This is being done by the Chamber of Mines, I might suggest, in an



attempt to anticipate a politically independent, black-run Rhodesia, but one in which, as part of a continued economic dependency, there would be a heavy flow of Zimbabwean labor southwards to Afrikanerdom.<sup>77</sup>

A second aspect of the approach now being adopted by the South African leadership as a response to the labor problem is a turn to capital-intensive methods. With the support of U.S., West German, and especially Japanese Foreign investment, South Africa is looking for labor-saving machinery which will reduce her dependency on "foreign", "native", or "foreign native" labor. The ~~January 18, 1975~~ newspaper of Johannesburg recently discussed the ~~roof off slope~~ drilling machine which will ~~potentially~~ reduce the underground work force "by as much as one half or more."

But the key component in this new strategy will be à la Henry Kissinger, detente. There will be an intensification of the outward looking policy and the make-new friends<sup>78</sup> games (in this countries like Liberia<sup>79</sup> and Senegal will play key roles). This will be accompanied by an effort to project South Africa as gradually and calmly (in contrast to Angola) solving all of its racial problems. And both of the above will be the ~~center~~ <sup>counter</sup> fugue to a very serious attempt to isolate the radical forces in Southern Africa, especially a Frelimo-led Mozambique.\*

#### A Personal and Concluding Note -

There is just as with Kissinger's planning for Southeast Asia, a major flaw in the strategy. Namely that, as with the Chinese experiment, there

\* In this latter category of activities, the military support of the U.S.A. will be especially called upon. This we already see in terms of the Diego Garcia developments, Pentagon-South Africa ties, and the effort to create a Southern Atlantic branch of NATO - key partners in which would be Brazil and South Africa.



are internal contradictions resolving themselves in South Africa that cannot be sidestepped by external treaty-making. The 57,000 Chinese workers ultimately resisted against conditions. Enough is not now known to say definitely, but it could be tentatively posed that the pattern of uprisings reveals a growing economic and political consciousness amongst the imported Chinese workers. (SEE APPENDIX I). It was not in the form of direct military struggle. But manifested itself in other ways. Let Henry and Johannes Balthazar turn to aboriginal labor from Australia for relief. The consciousness of African workers inside South Africa will continue to grow. So, too, will their resistance.



## FOOTNOTES

1. P. P., 1904, LXII, Cd. 2183, pp. 26-27.
2. The term "coolie" is in actuality two Chinese words, "Kung" and "lee". The second word literally means muscle, and kung means to "do work" or "to rent". Thus, the two together become "to rent muscle". In popular usage in China, the phrase depicted a class of unskilled workers. Unlike the view of this group assumed by the West, in China the kung lee class had more status than some other groups like businessmen or merchants. "Coolie" is often exclusively employed in the South African source material of the period. The particular racial connotations which accompany the term resulted from its Western usage, not its Chinese origins. See Coolidge, Mary, Chinese Immigration, Holt Inc., New York, 1909, p. 48.
3. In 1899, according to the 1902 Chamber of Mines Annual Report, the Transvaal mines employed over 111,690 Africans. By 1902 this figure was reduced to 28,613 Africans. And as the accompanying graph (SEE APPENDIX A) shows, the number of Africans employed rises dramatically with the arrival of the Chinese.
4. See Appendix B and B1. I arrived at this figure from the 1918 Chamber of Mines Annual Report. D.J. N. Denoon in his 1967 article "The Transvaal Labor Crisis, 1901-06" says that "during 1903 the mortality rate was 79.8 per thousand per annum, with a peak of 113.2 during the coldest month. (July)"
5. See Appendix C. This sharp drop in wages resulted from the creation of the Witwatersrand Native Labor Association (WNLA) in 1900. An explicit purpose of the Association was to prevent the mines from competing against one another for workers. A first step taken after this monopolization was to raise wages from the war time rate of 20 shillings to 30-35 shillings per month while at the same time downplaying the fact that this was a drop from the 1899 rate of 50 shillings monthly.
6. Enclosure No. 9, extract from Rand Daily Mail, April 3, 1903 in P. P. 1904, LXI, Cd. 1895, Further Correspondence Relating to the of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, P. 30.
7. Ibid., p. 31.
8. Ibid., p. 31.
9. Ibid., p. 33.
10. It is important to understand this South African need as not an isolated one. On a global scale, because of the stage of development in the various Western European capitalist countries, one sees the establishment of new mechanisms and institutions to meet the irregularity and inadequacy of the labor supply. From settlement



schemes and increased taxation in parts of Africa to patterns of indentured servitude from Asia, especially India, everywhere European colonial nations were attempting to maximize the accumulation of wealth at home by intensifying and cheapening their labor supply overseas.

11. See Wolff, Richard, The Economics of Colonialism, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1974.
12. See P. P. 1902 Cd. 1200 LXIX. Correspondence Relating to the Regulation and Supply of Labor in Southern Rhodesia pp. 573-579. And P. P. 1904 Cd. 2028 LXII Correspondence Relating to the Proposed Introduction of Indentured Asiatic (Chinese) Labor into Southern Rhodesia, pp. 697-734.
13. Tinker, Hugh, A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labor Overseas: 1830-1920, Oxford University Press, London, 1974, p. 299.
14. P. P. 1904, LXI, Cd. 1895, Further Correspondence Relating to the Affairs of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, telegram No. 11, p. 24.
15. Ibid. Telegram No. 16, p. 36.
16. See Appendix D and E. Constructed from the Transvaal Chamber of Mines Annual Reports.
17. The Times, London, February 10, 1903 speech by Lord Harris to the South African Gold Trust Limited general meeting.
18. Hobsbaum, E. J., Industry and Empire, Penguin, Middlesex, 1969, p. 151.
19. The phrase is not my own, but comes instead from: White, Peter, "The Eternal Treasure: Gold", National Geographic, January 1974, pp. 1-52.
20. Former Secretary of the Treasury, John Connally, once said while discussing exchange relations of currencies, "gold has no economic significance... gold makes good jewelry (Time, October 11, 1972)... And from time to time American and other western officials relegate gold to second-class citizenship status. But how interesting it has lately been to see: a) Thieu and Lon Nol's efforts to ferret 16 tons of the glittery little bars out of the country; and b) the setting up by American financiers of mechanisms for Vietnamese refugees to get American dollars in exchange for their gold bullion; and c) the fact that it is now legal for American citizens to own gold. It continues to be true, as R. Palme Dutt once argued in the African Communist (No. 48, First Quarter, 1972 "The Crisis of the World Capitalist Economy"), that "however complex the token structure built on this foundation, appearing to displace gold as an archaic remnant no longer applicable to modern conditions, and needing to be replaced by some more logical structure, this metallic foundation reveals itself anew in every situation of crisis of capitalism." (p. 44) On the American and Swiss bullion dealers negotiating with gold-bearing South Vietnamese see "the Great Refugee Gold Rush". The Guardian (London) May 8, 1975.



21. The reader is herein referred to a recent and interesting article from which this quote is taken, namely: "Kruger's Golden Rand: A Survey of Gold and South Africa", The Economist, March 22-28, 1975.
22. By "capitalism" I mean throughout this paper a system in which the means of production, as the result of a long historical process, are concentrated in the hands of one class which consists of a minority segment of the society. Attendant to this process is the emergence of a propertyless class for whom the sale of their labor power is the only source of livelihood. In turn these two groupings, as they relate to the process of production and as the one sells its only commodity - labor power - bring about a particular type of social relations in the society. It is not, in this definition, the existence of trade, the presence of a money-lending class or the use of currency which is the chief element. Rather, the essence is the yoking up of labor power to create surplus. In the particular case of South African capitalist development of more accurately capital accumulation, the owners of the productive processes were early compelled (perhaps because of the intensive pace of its growth) to seek from extra-territorial, indeed extra-continental sources "the muscular machines" to be yoked up. Or as Harry Braverman put it more eloquently, speaking of a more recent period,

"in periods of rapid accumulation, such as that which has taken place throughout the capitalist world since WWII, the relative surplus population which is the natural product of the capital accumulation process is supplemental with other sources of labor." (p. 117, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degredation of Work in the Twentieth Century, Monthly Review Press, 1974)

The reader is also referred to three other articles putting capitalism in a specifically South African framework: Legassick, Martin, "South Africa: Capital Accumulation and Violence", forthcoming in Economy and Society; Magubane, Bernard, "The Evolution of the Class Structure in Africa," unpublished paper 1975; and Wolpe, Harold, "Capitalism and Cheap Labor-power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid," Economy and Society, I, 4, 1972, pp. 425-56.

23. Marx, Karl, Capital, Volume III, ch. XXXV, Sec. 1, Lawrence and Wishart, London, P. 674.
24. The reader is also referred to Appendix F, accompanying table, Appendix G, and accompanying graph, Appendix G<sub>1</sub>.
25. See the excellent diagrammatic presentation of the gold mining process in the National Geographic article, op. cit.
26. Unsigned article, "Profile of a Gold Mine," in Optima (Journal of the Anglo-American Corporation), June 1973, p. 82.
27. Letter to Mr. Ransay Collins (19/4/04) in Milner Papers, ed. Cecil Headlam, Cassell Inc., London, 1933, vol. 2, p. 491.



28. Telegram. Lord Milner to Mr. Chamberlain. Ibid. p. 370.
29. 1903 P. P. SLV. Cd. 1640, p. 12.
30. The Transvaal Chamber of Mines in early 1903 also opened up a full time office in London so as "to facilitate the mutual development" of England and South Africa.
31. 1904 P. P. C. 1895. Telegraphic Correspondence Relating to the Transvaal Labor Importation Ordinance. p. 9.
32. Ibid. p. 9.
33. See Appendix H for categories of labor not available to indentured alien mine laborers and list of mines employing Chinese labor as of end of May, 1906.
34. Transvaal Colony, Foreign Labor Department Annual Reports, 1904-06 and the Labor Importation Ordinance. Appendix to Telegraphic Correspondence Relating to the Transvaal Labor Importation Ordinance, op. cit., pp. 9-18.
35. "The Foreign Labor Department" in Praagh, L.V., ed., The Transvaal and Its Mines: The Encyclopedic History of the Transvaal, Praagh and Lloyd, London Johannesburg, 1906, pp. 528-530.
36. Legassick, Martin "South Africa," op. cit. p. 256.
37. Donald Denoon, in his article "The Transvaal Labor Crisis, 1901-06" (J. A. H. VII, 3 (1967) : 481-494), unlike most other Southern African historians, e.g., Francis Wilson, he does point out that "the Chamber of Mines decided the Chinese were necessary before putting the issue before the public." I am not arguing that there was not considerable public debate. There was. Some of which resulted in modifications to the importation scheme. Basically, though, when in the spring months of 1904, groups like the South African Labor Party, argued against the Chinese Ordinance, they argued not about proposed legislation but <sup>about</sup> activity already underway.
38. For elaboration see Campbell, Persia, Chinese Coolie Emigration to Countries within the British Empire, Negro Universities Press, New York, orig. publ. 1923.
- 38A. Tawney, R.H. Land and Labor in China, Bedeon, Boston, 1966, p. 122.
39. South Africa, Transvaal, Mines Department, Annual Report of the Government Mining Engineer, 1905.
40. Foreign Labor Department, Annual Report, 1904-5, Appendix 6, "General Plan of Compound for Chinese Laborers".
41. Ibid., p. 3.
42. Ibid., p. 12.
43. Ibid., and Campbell, Persia, Chinese Coolie Emigration, op. cit. pl. 189.



44. Foreign Labor Department, Annual Report, 1904-5, p. 12.
45. The death figures cited throughout all the primary material must be regarded cautiously. For instance, in the 1905-06 Foreign Labor Department Annual Report on page 21 says that 68 laborers of the 15,108 embarked during the year died during the voyage. The Report goes on to give the on-board Medical Staff's Register of Deaths for 1 voyage as follows: pneumonia 2, Relapsing fever 26, Relapsing fever and Opium Habit 3, Diarrhea and Exhaustion 1, Acute Enteritis 3, Tuberculosis 1, a total of 36. However, the ship in question, the Indravelli, made three voyages during the year and three other ships made an additional five voyages. If we assume that only an average of 18 died each voyage (as was the case with the 31st shipment of the "Cranley"), then the more accurate death en route figure becomes more than doubled the 144.

The more I read, the more inclined I am to accept as minimal Dr. J. J. Simon's seemingly extraordinary calculation (based on Chamber of Mines Annual Reports) that "36,000 men had been killed in accidents on South African gold mines between 1900 and 1961". His figure doesn't even cover death by disease, (whether on the mining premise or back in the "kraal"), let alone complexities and nuances like that discussed above. See his "Death in South African Mines," Africa South In Exile, July-Sept. 1961: pp. 41-56.

46. 1905, P. P. Cd. 2786, No. 15.
47. Praagh, ed., The Transvaal and Its Mines, op. cit., p. 536.
48. Foreign Labor Department, Annual Reports, 1904-5 and 1905-6.
49. See House of Commons Debates, Nov. 15, 1906, p. 202. More recently, Ernest Cole in his book House of Bondage (Random House, 1967) speaks about the incidence of homosexuality among African mine workers in the 1960's. He writes:

"With women unavailable, homosexuality is widespread. There is even a word in minetalk for sleeping with another man: matamyola. The mine officials condone and encourage this and raw jokes about matamyola are frequent." (p. 24)

So, too, the homosexuality amongst the Chinese mine workers. And though the Labor Importation Ordinance permitted the "coolies" to bring their wives and children, only two Chinese women ever appeared on the Rand. One clear reason for this was that "the transportation costs of additional passengers" would be deducted from the worker's earnings.

50. The universality of this process is amply demonstrated in many studies of various situations. See, e.g., Charles Tilly's study of the disorganization accompanying industrialization in Nineteenth Century France, "The Chaos of the Living City", in Violence As Politics (Hirsch & Perry edited, 1973).



51. Foreign Labor Department, Annual Report, 1905-06, p. 13.
52. Ibid., p. 10
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., Appendix 2.
55. As cited in Denoon, "Transvaal Labor Crisis", op. cit., p. 492.
56. Their report is to be found in the Transvaal Chamber of Mines Annual Report for 1906, pp. 537-570.
57. Drawn up by the 1906 Special Committee on Control.
58. Foreign Labor Department, Annual Report, 1904-05, p. 15.
59. Ibid., p. 15.
60. Report on Control of Chinese Indentured Laborers, op. cit. letter from the Chief Magistrate, p. 567.
61. Ibid., p. 556-57.
62. 1906, P.P. Cd. 3025. Enclosure in No. 120.
63. It was actually Mr. Evans, Superintendent of Foreign Labor, who had approved "the infliction of light corporal punishment" in cases of "unruliness" on the mines. When informed of Evans' action, Milner thought it "harmless". Both Milner and Evans had expected (they would testify later) that the punishment would be like caning a schoolboy and not flogging. See Headlam, ed. The Milner Papers, Vol. I, p. 559.
64. It was indeed, as Shula Marks brilliantly points out in her chapter "Rumors and Red Herrings" in Reluctant Rebellion (Oxford, 1970) a period in which "rumors were rife all over South Africa. An interesting study would be one comparing the rumors around imminent African uprisings with those about an equally imminent takeover by an Asiatic horde. Both speak to a particular psychological disposition of white settler communities.
65. In July of 1906, the Foreign Labor Department at the instructions of the Colonial Office instituted a scheme of voluntary repatriation before contract expiry. It didn't work too well as the "coolies", besides having to reveal their savings, also had to give ½ month's wages towards their own passage. Manchester Guardian, July 6, 1906. Essentially, it was an effort by the British government to quietly slip out of the whole Chinese labor affair.
66. It is not only a question of color. Clearly the historical development of South African society shows a subtle and particular admixture of class and color being employed as the twin pillars of a system of exploitation. The emphasis, however, must rest on



the former element, not the latter. Within capitalism, color serves as the handmaiden of class exploitation and oppression. In South Africa, color oppression has been and is a way of organizing the system of social relations within the larger phenomenon of the capitalist mode of production. But for the most substantive elaboration on this question - The dialectic between class and race in the development of capitalism in South Africa - we will have to await Ben Magubane's The Political Economy of Class and Race in South Africa to be published by Nok in the fall of 1975.


67. One clear indication of the extent to which conditions for African workers were not substantively altered is the mortality rate. Among Mocambiquan miners alone the average number of deaths/year due to accidents and disease was 3,623. Between 1902 and 1914, forty-three thousand, four hundred and eighty-four Mozambiquan miners died. See Riberio, Anuario de Mocambique, Imprensa Nacional, Lourenco Marques, 1917.
68. The Milner Papers, op. cit., p. 488.
69. As cited in Walker, Ivan, 2000 Casualties: A History of the Trade Unions and Labor Movement in South Africa, Natal Press, Johannesburg, 1961, p. 17.
70. 1906 Annual Report, Transvaal, Chamber of Mines
71. Numerous articles have appeared recently on this, e.g., mentioning a few: "South African mining threatened over manpower", Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1975; "White South African Labor Strife Looms", Los Angeles Times, February 3, 1975; "The Life-Blood of Apartheid", Observer (London), April 20, 1975.
72. Thus far, no clear indication has been given as to how the Frelimo-led government will decide. The transitional government led by Prime Minister, Joaquim Chissano, has been very careful not to commit itself one way or the other. The reader is referred to the bi-monthly Dutch publication, Facts and Reports for further information on this question.
73. The shortage is not by any means confined to the gold mines but is generalized throughout the mining sector. So, too, is the labor unrest also found in South Africa's coal, copper, platinum, vanadium, asbestos and uranium mines. The labor struggles also can be traced to the massive 1973 Ovambo walkouts from the Tsumeh mines in Namibia. And they should not be separated from the massive strike on Durban's docks, also in 1973.
74. See, for instance, "Mine Labor Unrest: A Grim Indictment" Johannesburg Star, January 18, 1975.
75. This is a most minimal estimate based only on looking at the mining sector. The January 18, 1975 Johannesburg Star article, op. cit. states "37,000 striking mineworkers, 22 fatalities and more than 160 other casualties in 16 strikes or disturbances in the past five months!"



76. Rolfe, Richard, "Let's Go the Mines, Joe" Financial Times, January 16, 1975.
77. In this respect it would be a situation paralleling Mexico's economic dependency on the USA especially in terms of her dependency on the legal (or illegal) earnings by her national workers who have migrated to the USA, or who maintain dual lives based on the seasonal demands of the USA labor market.
78. "Latin America, Africa quietly extend hands," Christian Science Monitor, January 15, 1975.
79. See "Tolbert: Mr. Vorster would be 'pleased' to get rid of SW Africa", The Times (London), February 17, 1975.



# NUMBER OF WORKERS IN SERVICE IN SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD MINES, 1904-1909






# MORTALITY RATES FROM DISEASE (DEATHS PER THOUSAND) SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD MINES, 1903-1908

NOTE: SCALE DIFFERS

Source: Foreign Labor  
Department Annual Reports  
1905-06, 1907-08  
Transvaal Chamber of Mines  
Reports, 1919





RATIO OF DEATHS BY DISEASE  
TO DEATHS BY ACCIDENT  
(Black, 1906-1909, inc., coloured\*1910-1919, inc.)


SOURCE: CHAMBER OF MINES ANNUAL REPORTS

Year	Ratio	Deaths by Disease	(Deaths by Pneumonia)	D. by Acc.
1906	6, 36	3246		510
1907	6, 71	3, 760		562
1908	7, 85	4, 763		607
+ 1909	5, 55	5, 363		966
* .....				
1910	7, 34	6, 560		894
1911	7, 57	6, 538		864
+ 1912	6, 36	5, 675		892
1913	6, 46	5, 178		802
+ 1914	4, 86	3, 079	(852 pneumonia)	634
1915	5, 50	3, 643	(1392)	662
+ 1916	4, 32	3232	(1188)	749
1917	4, 18	2531	(706)	605
*+ 1918	10, 44	4, 458	(792) + 1,082 ?	427
1919	5, 27	2868		544

- + 1909 abnormal increase in accident victims, normal increase in deaths from disease
- 1912 normal increase in accident victims, decrease in deaths from disease
- 1914 abnormal drops in accident victims, deaths from disease, and numbers of workers in service
- 1919 influenza for



MONEY WAGES IN  
SHILLINGS, *per month*  
SOUTH AFRICAN  
GOLD MINES  
1895 - 1909








# RATIO OF WHITES TO OTHER WORKERS SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD MINES 1899-1913

Source: Transvaal  
Chamber of Mines Annual  
Report, 1919


ONLY NATIVES  
INCLUDES CHINESE  
KEY













G

## Estimated Gold Production of the World since 1887, and Proportion produced by South Africa

Year	kilograms fine 1 000	South Africa Percentage	Year	kilograms fine 1 000	South Africa Percentage
1887	159,4	0,8	1931	696,9	48,6
1888	166,7	4,2	1932	755,8	47,6
1889	186,1	5,9	1933	788,0	43,5
1890	178,0	7,7	1934	849,0	38,4
1891	190,0	11,3	1935	921,4	36,4
1892	220,9	15,1	1936	1 031,2	34,2
1893	237,0	15,7	1937	1 088,1	33,5
1894	272,7	20,6	1938	1 163,6	32,5
1895	299,3	21,0	1939	1 188,1	33,6
1896	304,2	20,7	1940	1 251,7	34,9
1897	355,1	24,0	1941	1 226,6	36,5
1898	431,6	27,6	1942	1 086,7	40,4
1899	466,9	24,2	1943	830,3	48,0
1900	383,9	2,8	1944	745,2	51,3
1901	395,1	2,0	1945	716,7	53,1
1902	449,7	11,9	1946	731,1	50,7
1903	493,1	18,7	1947	742,3	46,9
1904	522,7	22,4	1948	776,3	46,4
1905	571,5	26,7	1949	774,0	45,2
1906	604,8	29,8	1950	826,9	43,9
1907	621,4	32,3	1951	804,5	44,5
1908	666,4	32,9	1952	823,8	44,6
1909	683,0	32,2	*1953	762,0	48,7
1910	685,0	34,2	1954	805,6	51,1
1911	696,3	36,7	1955	846,0	53,7
1912	702,3	40,3	1956	880,2	56,2
1913	702,3	39,0	1957	917,6	57,7
1914	672,1	38,9	1958	951,8	57,7
1915	709,1	39,9	1959	1 020,2	61,2
1916	683,7	42,3	1960	1 066,8	62,3
1917	631,2	44,9	1961	1 104,2	64,6
1918	576,6	45,4	1962	1 169,5	67,8
1919	539,4	48,0	1963	1 213,6	70,3
1920	500,1	50,7	1964	1 247,3	72,6
1921	495,8	51,0	1965	1 281,5	74,1
1922	478,9	45,5	1966	1 284,6	74,8
1923	552,9	51,5	†1967	1 237,9	76,7
1924	583,6	51,0	†1968	1 247,3	77,5
1925	583,4	51,2	†1969	1 250,4	77,8
1926	595,7	52,0	†1970	1 275,2	78,4
1927	594,7	52,9	†1971	1 231,7	79,3
1928	590,3	54,6	†1972	1 153,9	78,8
1929	600,3	53,9	†1973	1 101,1	77,4
1930	650,3	51,3			


\*As from 1953 figures exclude U.S.S.R.  
†Estimated or provisional figure.

From Chamber of Mines of  
South Africa, 84th Annual Report, 1973



51.

# PROPORTION OF WORLD'S GOLD PRODUCTION FROM SOUTH AFRICA, 1887-1973



SOURCE: CHAMBER OF MINES OF SOUTH AFRICA,  
84<sup>th</sup> ANNUAL REPORT, 1973

(NOTE: SMALL DECLINE IN 1907 DUE TO WORLD-WIDE DEPRESSION)



G<sub>2</sub>

**TABLE 12**  
**GOLD OUTPUT OF THE TRANSVAAL AND ORANGE FREE STATE\***  
**1884-1965**

Year	Fine Gold Ounces (000)	Realized Value (£000)	Year	Fine Gold Ounces (000)	Realized Value (£000)
1884	2.4	10.1	1926	9,954.8	42,285.1
1885	1.4	6.0	1927	10,122.5	42,997.5
1886	8.2	34.7	1928	10,354.2	43,981.7
1887	39.9	169.4	1929	10,412.3	44,228.7
1888	227.7	967.4	1930	10,716.3	45,520.1
1889	350.9	1,490.6	1931	10,877.7	46,205.6
1890	440.1	1,869.6	1932	11,557.9	49,772.9
1891	688.4	2,924.3	1933	11,012.3	68,678.0
1892	1,069.1	4,541.1	1934	10,479.2	72,313.9
1893	1,290.2	5,480.5	1935	10,773.0	75,526.1
1894	1,805.0	7,667.1	1936	11,335.1	79,498.2
1895	2,017.4	8,569.6	1937	11,734.5	82,556.5
1896	2,025.5	8,603.8	1938	12,161.4	86,669.5
1897	2,743.5	11,653.7	1939	12,821.1	99,554.8
1898	3,823.4	16,240.6	1940	14,046.5	117,990.6
1899	3,637.7	15,452.0	1941	14,406.8	121,016.8
1900	348.8	1,481.4	1942	14,126.3	118,660.8
1901	258.0	1,096.0	1943	12,804.3	107,556.3
1902	1,718.9	7,301.5	1944	12,279.6	103,148.9
1903	2,972.9	12,628.0	1945	12,224.2	105,281.1
1904	3,773.5	16,028.9	1946	11,927.0	102,870.4
1905	4,909.5	20,854.4	1947	11,200.3	96,602.3
1906	5,792.8	24,606.3	1948	11,584.7	99,917.8
1907	6,450.7	27,401.0	1949	11,705.0	114,864.4
1908	7,056.3	29,973.1	1950	11,663.6	144,774.1
1909	7,295.1	30,987.6	1951	11,516.4	142,947.9
1910	7,527.1	31,973.1	1952	11,818.7	147,130.8
1911	8,249.5	35,041.5	1953	11,940.6	147,565.0
1912	9,107.5	38,686.2	1954	13,237.1	164,675.2
1913	8,798.3	37,372.9	1955	14,601.4	182,745.2
1914	8,394.3	35,656.8	1956	15,896.7	198,499.5
1915	9,093.9	38,628.4	1957	17,030.7	212,584.9
1916	9,296.6	39,489.5	1958	17,656.4	220,024.6
1917	9,018.1	38,306.4	1959	20,065.5	250,135.7
1918	8,418.3	35,758.6	1960	21,382.6	268,003.5
1919	8,331.3	39,277.9	1961	22,941.4	287,447.9
1920	8,158.2	45,604.5	1962	25,491.9	318,290.2
1921	8,128.7	43,420.7	1963	27,431.9	343,156.0
1922	7,009.8	32,343.1	1964	29,111.5	365,244.8
1923	9,148.8	41,573.6	1965	30,553.9	383,274.6
1924	9,574.9	44,738.8			
1925	9,597.6	40,767.9			
			Total	781,557.7	6,621,877.0

\* Adapted from a table compiled on the basis of Government sources of information by the Statistical Department of the Chamber of Mines; includes output of non-members of the Chamber. It should be noted that by 1945 only about 73 per cent of gold output was from mines which had come into existence before 1932; by 1965 this had fallen to about 13 per cent. Moreover in 1965 about 70 per cent of the output came from mines established after 1946.

SOURCE: FRANKEL, S. H., INVESTMENT  
AND THE RETURN TO EQUITY CAPITAL  
IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD MINING  
INDUSTRY 1887-1965: AN INTERNATIONAL  
COMPARISON, HARVARD PRESS, CAMBRIDGE, 1967.



# I. CATEGORIES OF LABOR NOT AVAILABLE TO INDENTURED ALIEN

## MINE LABORERS

Amalgamator, assayer, blacksmith, boilermaker, brassfinisher, brass-moulder, brickmaker, overseer, bricklayer, banksman, carpenter, coppersmith, clerk, cyanide shiftsman, drill sharpener, driver of air or steam winch, driver of mechanical or electrical machinery, engineer, electrician, engine driver, fitter, fireman-overseer, gauger, ironmoulder, joiner, mine storeman, mechanic, machinist, millwright, machine sawyer, mason, mine overseer, machine rockdriller, mine carpenter, miller, overseer in any capacity other than the management and control of laborers, onsetter, patternmaker, plumber, painter, plasterer, pipeman, pumpman, platelayer, quarryman overseer, rigger, stonecutter, signaller, skipman, sampler, turner, tinsmith, timberman, timekeeper, wiresplicer, woodworking machinist.

Source: Transvaal Labor Importation Ordinance (1903)

# II. LIST OF MINES EMPLOYING CHINESE LABORERS AS OF END OF

MAY, 1906

Group.	Mine.	Number of Coolies.
East Rand Proprietary Mines, Ltd. ..	{ Angelo Gold-mining Co., Ltd. ..	2,100
	{ New Comet Gold-mining Co., Ltd. ..	1,021
	{ Cason Gold-mining Co., Ltd. ..	(No fixed number).
Geduld Proprietary Gold-mining Co., Ltd.	Geduld Proprietary Mines, Ltd. ..	479
General Mining and Finance Corporation, Ltd. (eastern section)	{ Van Ryn Estate and Gold Mines, Ltd. ..	905
Ditto (western section) ..	{ Rand Collieries, Ltd. ..	400
Randfontein Estates Gold-mining Co., Ltd.	Aurora West United Gold-mining Co., Ltd. ..	207
	North Randfontein Gold-mining Co., Ltd. ..	1,802
New Kleinfontein Co., Ltd. ..	{ Kleinfontein Deep, Ltd. ..	3,114
	{ Benoni Gold-mining Co., Ltd. ..	
	{ Rand Kipfontein Co., Ltd. ..	
Consolidated Langlaagte Mines, Ltd. ..	—	1,834
Durban Roodepoort Deep, Ltd. ..	—	810
French Rand Gold-mining Co., Ltd. ..	—	2,122
Glen Deep, Ltd. ..	—	1,875
Goldenhuis Deep, Ltd. ..	—	1,400
Henry Nourse Gold-mining Co., Ltd. ..	—	1,258
Jumpers Deep, Ltd. ..	—	1,377
Jupiter Gold-mining Co., Ltd. ..	—	544
Lancaster Gold-mining Co., Ltd. ..	—	1,040
Middelfontein Extension, Ltd. ..	—	(No fixed number).
New Middelfontein Gold-mining Co., Ltd.	—	1,200
New Heriot Gold-mining Co., Ltd. ..	—	(No fixed number).
New Rietfontein Gold-mining Co., Ltd. ..	—	(No fixed number).
Nourse Deep, Ltd. ..	—	1,070
Princess Estate and Gold-mining Co., Ltd.	—	1,360
Roodepoort Gold-mining Co., Ltd. ..	—	400
Rose Deep, Ltd. ..	—	1,464
Shimmer & Jack Proprietary Mines, Ltd.	—	4,402
Shimmer & Jack East, Ltd. ..	—	1,165
South Nourse, Ltd. ..	—	242
South Rose Deep, Ltd. ..	—	(No fixed number).
South Goldenhuis Deep, Ltd. ..	—	234
Tudor Gold-mining Co., Ltd. ..	—	(No fixed number).
Van Dyk Proprietary Mines, Ltd. ..	—	(No fixed number).
Village Deep, Ltd. ..	—	(No fixed number).
Wilwatersrand Gold-mining Co., Ltd. ..	—	2,002
Wilwatersrand Deep, Ltd. ..	—	3,167

Source: The Encyclopedic History of the Transvaal (1906)